On his blog, Helian Unbound notes that anti-natalism is built on an inverted morality, in that it takes evolutionary mechanisms that we use to survive (compassion, empathy, and aversion to suffering), both as individuals and as a species, and uses them as the basis to advocate for our self-imposed extinction, which is what these mechanisms are meant to prevent in the first place. Maverick Philosopher has attempted to solve this dilemma, with some success.

I agree with Harris that it's a blatant double standard for Benatar to apply an experiential mode of argumentation for one scenario ("people who aren't born aren't deprived of pleasure") and an abstract, non-experiential mode for the other scenario ("absence of suffering is good even if there's nobody to appreciate it").

I guess Benatar could say that, if it really is a double standard, then we are not justified in our practice of mercy killing when it comes to deformed fetuses or euthanasia for people who wish to end their lives, since the deformed fetus and the depressed person won't benefit. But then all that leaves us with is the option to allow the deformed fetus to be born, to allow the depressed person to go on living against their will, which would of course be experientially bad. It's all very paradoxical. Such is life, I guess.

I also wish to highlight the problems with some of Benatar's most oft-repeated sentiments. "You can't have a child for that child's sake" is true, but it is equally true that you cannot not have a child for that child's sake. "Non-existent people cannot offer consent to being born" is true, but they also cannot withhold consent. And as for his analogy about absent life on other planets, it occurs to me that we aren't constantly rejoicing about the absence of suffering on Mars.

Actually CHOSING to bring children into this experiment is tantamount to child abuse.